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Derivatives and the Bankruptcy Code: Why the
Special Treatment?
Franklin R. Edwardst
Edward R. Morrisontt
in Fall
The collapse of Long Term Capital Management ("LTCM'
1998 and the Federal Reserve Bank's subsequent efforts to orchestratea bailout raise important questions about the structureof the Bankruptcy Code. The
Code contains numerous provisions affording special treatment to financial
derivatives contracts, the most important of which exempts these contracts
from the "automatic stay" and permits counterparties to terminate derivatives
contracts with a debtor in bankruptcy and seize underlying collateral. No
other counterparty or creditor of the debtor has such freedom; to the contrary,
the automatic stay prohibits them from undertaking any act that threatens the
debtor's assets. It is commonly believed that the exemption for derivatives
contracts helps reduce "systemic risk" in financial markets, that is, the risk
that multiple major financial market participants will fail at the same time
and, as a result, drasticallyreduce market liquidity. Indeed, Congress is now
contemplating reforms that would extend the exemption to include a broader
array offinancial contracts, all in the name of reducing systemic risk. This is
a mistake. The Bankruptcy Code can do little to reduce systemic risk and may
in fact exacerbate it, as the experience of L TCM suggests. Risk of a systemic
meltdown arose there and prompted intervention by the Federal Reserve
precisely because derivatives contracts were exempt from the automatic stay.
Derivatives contracts may merit special treatment, but fear of systemic risk is
a red herring.
A better, efficiency-based reason for treating derivatives contracts
differently arises naturallyfrom the economic theory underlying the automatic
stay. The stay protects assets to the extent they are needed to preserve a firm's
going-concern surplus (its value above and beyond the sale value of its
assets). Assets are needed to preserve going-concern surplus only if they are
firm-specific, that is, only if they are worth more inside the firm than outside
it. This is often true for plant and equipment. It is rarely true for derivatives
contracts. This observation, we think, helps rationalize the Code 's treatment
f
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of derivatives contracts and other features of the automatic stay. There are,
however, downsides to treating derivatives contracts differently (creditors,for
example, would like to disguise loans as derivatives contracts). These
downsides are probably not significant, but they highlight the fragility of the
Code's treatment of derivatives contracts, which should worry members of
Congress as they consider arguments to expand the Code's exemptions for
derivatives contracts.
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Introduction
In Fall 1998 the Federal Reserve Bank (the "Fed") arranged a bailout of
the massive hedge find, Long Term Capital Management ("LTCM"), which
faced the prospect of immediate liquidation if it filed a petition under the U.S.
Bankruptcy Code. Although the Code's "automatic stay" generally protects a
firm from immediate liquidation-by prohibiting creditors and contractual
partners from seizing assets or terminating ongoing contracts without court
permission-LTCM enjoyed no such protection. It was party to tens of
thousands of derivatives contracts, which receive special treatment under the
Code. Even if LTCM had filed a bankruptcy petition, its derivatives
counterparties would have been free to terminate the contracts and then seize
collateral to the extent they were owed money. Defending the Fed's decision to
assist LTCM, Federal Reserve Chairman Alan Greenspan explained:
[T]he act of unwinding. LTCM's portfolio in a forced liquidation
[precipitated by LTCM's derivatives counterparties] would not only have a
significant distorting impact on market prices, but also in the process could
produce large losses-or worse-for a number of creditors and
counterparties, and for other markets participants who were not directly
involved with LTCM ....

1 Hedge Fund Operations: Hearing Before the House Comm. on Banking and Fin. Servs.,
105th Cong. 23 (1998) (testimony of Alan Greenspan, Chairman, Board of Governors of the Federal
Reserve System).
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The macroeconomic effects ofLTCM's liquidation, Greenspan believed, would
have been serious: "[h]ad the failure of LTCM triggered the seizing up of
markets, substantial damage could have been inflicted on many market
participants ... and could have potentially impaired the economies of many
nations, including our own." 2 The Fed concluded, in other words, that its
intervention was necessary to avoid a systemic meltdown that might arise from
LTCM's liquidation-a liquidation made possible by the Bankruptcy Code's
special treatment of derivatives contracts. 3
The irony here is that the Bankruptcy Code's special treatment of
derivatives contracts is, according to academics and members of Congress,
designed to avoid systemic risk. A derivative is a financial instrument whose
price depends on the value of an underlying asset, such as common stock.4 A
derivatives contract defines the rights and obligations of the buyer and seller of
the derivative (the "counterparties"). Examples include forward contracts
(obligating one party to buy the underlying asset from another party at a certain
price at a future date), options (giving one party the right but not the obligation
to buy the underlying asset at a certain price at a future date), and swaps
(obligating the two parties to exchange cash flows from underlying assets for a
set period). 5 The Code recognizes these and other kinds of derivatives
contracts, including securities contracts, commodity contracts, forward
contracts, 8 repurchase agreements ("repos"), 9 and swap agreements. 0

2
Id. at 24.
3
On this point, see, e.g., Michael Krimminger, Insolvency in the FinancialMarkets: Banks,
Hedge Funds, and Other Complications,BANKING POL. REP., Jan. 18, 1999, at 1.
4
See generally JOHN C, HULL, OPTIONS, FUTURES, AND OTHER DERIVATIVES 1 (5th ed.
2003).
5
For a description of these instruments and the benefits of derivatives (namely, the ability to
hedge hard-to-hedge risks), see Rene M. Stulz, Should We FearDerivatives?, 18 J. ECON. PERSP. 173,
174-76, 179-80 (2004).
6
11 U.S.C. § 741(7) (2004) ("'Securities contract' means contract for the purchase, sale, or
loan of a security, including an option for the purchase or sale of a security, certificate of deposit, or
group or index of securities .... ).
7
A "commodity contract" includes, inter alia, "with respect to a futures commission
merchant, contract for the purchase or sale of a commodity for future delivery on, or subject to the
rules of, a contract market or board of trade." § 761(4)(A).
8
§ 101(25) ("'Forward contract' means a contract.
for the purchase, sale, or transfer of
a commodity., or any similar good.., which is presently or in the future becomes the subject of
dealing in the forward contract trade. .. with a maturity date more than two days after the date the
contract is entered into, including .. . a repurchase transaction, reverse repurchase transaction,
consignment, lease, swap, hedge transaction .... ).
9
§ 101(47) ( "'Repurchase agreement' .. means an agreement.. which provides for the
transfer of certificates of deposit, eligible bankers' acceptances, or securities that are direct
obligations of, or that are fully guaranteed as to principal and interest by, the United States ... against
the transfer of funds by the transferee ... with a simultaneous agreement by [the] transferee to
transfer to the transferor thereof [instruments at a date certain not later than one year after such
transfers or on demand, against the transfer funds.").
10
A "swap agreement" includes a broad range of instruments, including a "rate swap
agreement, basis swap, foreign rate agreement, commodity swap" and "any other similar agreement."
§ 101(53B).
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Thanks to an exemption from the Code's automatic stay-which bars all
other creditors from terminating contracts with or seizing assets from a firm in
bankruptcy-counterparties to these derivatives contracts are free to terminate
the contracts and then seize collateral to the extent that they are owed money.
As reported in legislative history, Congress believed this exemption from the
automatic stay was necessary to prevent the "insolvency of one commodity or
security firm [from] spreading to other firms and possibly threatening the
12
collapse of the affected market." 11 This belief is shared by some academics. In
other words, Congress amended the Bankruptcy Code to prevent a systemic
collapse that might arise if a derivatives counterparty were unable to liquidate
3
its contracts with a bankrupt debtor immediately.' But, as the LTCM
experience demonstrates, permitting the immediate liquidation of a large
financial institution counterparty such as LTCM can generate another form of
systemic risk, namely the risk that a "run" by derivatives counterparties on the
debtor will itself destabilize financial markets.
The Fed's intervention to aid LTCM, therefore, calls into question the
policy rationale underlying the Bankruptcy Code's special treatment of
derivatives. In this paper, we make the following claim: derivatives may
deserve special treatment, but not for the reason commonly given. When
systemic risk is a legitimate concern, the Code can do little to mitigate it, and
may even make matters worse, especially in cases in which large financial
institutions (such as LTCM) are involved. But if systemic risk is a red herring,
is there any justification for treating derivatives contracts differently under the
Bankruptcy Code? We think there is: derivatives contracts are generally not
firm-specific assets and therefore giving them special treatment will increase
economic efficiency. This observation may help rationalize many features of the
Code's automatic stay, which offers the greatest protection to potentially firmspecific assets (such as plant and equipment), less protection to assets (such as
cash collateral) that are fungible but may be hard to replace without substantial
investments in relationships with new lenders, and the least protection to assets
(such as derivatives contracts) that can be replaced easily.
Part I describes the Code's special treatment of derivatives contracts and
the common justification given for it. In Part 1I,we challenge this conventional
H.R. REP. No. 97-420, at 1 (1982).
11
Although academics have questioned thelikelihood and gravity of a systemic collapse in
12
derivatives markets, some have at least implicitly accepted the proposition that the Bankruptcy Code's
special treatment of derivatives reduces therisk of a collapse. See, e.g., William J.Bergman etal.,
Netting, Financial Contracts, and Banks: The Economic Implications 30-32 (August 2003) (working
paper, on file with author); see also Stulz, supra note 5, at 188 (2004) (suggesting that the Code's
treatment of derivatives may play a role in reducing systemic risk).
Of course, members of Congress might have considered other purported benefits of
13
giving derivatives contracts special treatment under the Bankruptcy Code. One such benefit is growth
in over-the-counter (OTC) derivatives markets, emphasized by Bergman etal., supra note 12, at 2427. By allowing counterparties to close out contracts with and seize collateral from insolvent debtors,
the Code reduces the costs of entering derivatives contracts and thereby encourages growth in OTC
Section V.A, that this purported benefit is as questionable as the Code's
markets. We suggest, infra
role inreducing systemic risk.
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wisdom, arguing that the Code is a poor tool for reducing systemic risk.
Indeed, as the case of LTCM illustrates, the Code may in fact exacerbate this
risk. Part III asks whether there are alternative (efficiency-based) justifications for
the special treatment given to derivatives contracts under the Bankruptcy Code.
Derivatives contracts are different, we argue, because they are fungible assets and
can be seized by creditors without endangering a firm's going-concern value.
Part IV looks closely at the ex ante costs of a rule that treats derivatives
contracts differently. We focus particularly on the rent-seeking behavior induced
by such a rule. The benefits arguably outweigh the costs, but only if the rule
either reduces systemic risk (which we doubt) or singles out fungible assets that
creditors can seize without endangering a firm's going-concern value (which we
think is the case). If neither condition holds true, there is no principled reason
for offering special treatment under the Bankruptcy Code to derivatives
contracts. Part V concludes.
I.

Derivatives Contracts and the Bankruptcy Code

When a firm files a bankruptcy petition, it immediately enjoys the benefit
of the Bankruptcy Code's "automatic stay," which forbids any creditor from
taking steps to collect debts, seize assets, or otherwise "exercise control over
property" of the debtor firm. 14 The automatic stay is a core element of any
attempt to reorganize under the Code. By shielding the debtor's assets and
preventing a race that rewards the first creditor to the courthouse, it avoids
dismemberment of a firm with going-concern value and facilitates a collective
proceeding in which the parties (debtor and creditors) can negotiate the terms
under which the firm will continue as a going concern.
There are, however, many exceptions to the automatic stay. Some are
intuitive. The stay, for example, does not extend to the government's police or
regulatory power; a debtor cannot avoid criminal prosecution or the enforcement
of environmental protection laws (unless, of course, the government is simply
using its regulatory powers to collect debts).' 5 Along the same lines, a
bankrupt educational institution cannot use the stay to prevent accrediting
agencies, state licensing bodies, or the Secretary of Education from reevaluating
the institution's quality and eligibility for funding." Here we see a
congressional judgment that the benefits of government regulation outweigh the
costs to the debtor.
Other exceptions are less intuitive, especially those involving derivatives
contracts, such as futures, forwards, repos, and swaps." Generally, when a
debtor firm enters bankruptcy, it is party to many ongoing ("executory")

14
15
16
17

11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(3) (2000).
§ 362(b)(1), (4).
§ 362(b)(14), (15), (16).
For a description of these and other derivatives contracts, see Stulz, supra note 12, at 174-

76.
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contracts, in which the debtor and its counterparties have continuing
obligations to each other. Some of these contracts will be profitable to the
debtor (they are "in the money"); others will not be (they are "out of the
money"). The automatic stay prevents counterparties from taking any step to
terminate these ongoing contracts. 18 Instead the debtor has an exclusive right to
"assume" profitable contracts and "reject" (i.e., breach) unprofitable ones, the
consequence being that the counterparty to the "rejected" contract will receive
an unsecured claim for damages, which will usually be paid a few cents on the
dollar. In other words, the Bankruptcy Code generally allows debtors to
"cherry pick" profitable fiom unprofitable contracts. This cherrypicking power
comes to an end, however, when the underlying contracts are derivatives
contracts. Thanks to an exemption from the automatic stay, derivatives
counterparties typically 19 may terminate ongoing contracts when a debtor enters
bankruptcy. Moreover, if a counterparty has entered multiple derivatives
contracts with the debtor, the counterparty can set-off in-the-money contracts
against out-of-the-money contracts. (The process of terminating and setting-off
contracts is often termed "close-out netting.") Finally, if a debtor posted
margin or other collateral to support its obligations under these contracts, the
counterparty is flee to seize it to the extent that the debtor is a net obligor to
the counterparty.2 ° In other words, thanks to an exemption from the automatic
stay, derivatives counterparties can minimize their exposure to losses arising
from the insolvency of a debtor. If the debtor has posted collateral sufficient to
cover its obligations, the exemptions from the automatic stay effectively
eliminate a counterparty's exposure to loss.
The special treatment of derivatives contracts is not new. When the
Bankruptcy Code was enacted in 1978, it contained an exemption from the
automatic stay for non-debtor brokers and forward merchants with respect to
transactions involving margin payments or deposits received from a debtor
under a commodities contract or a forward contract. 2 1 Amendments to the Code
in 1982, 1984, and 1990 expanded the exemption to include an array of
financial transactions known as "derivatives securities" contracts, including

18
§ 365(a).
19
The qualifier "typically" must be used because some of the Code's provisions depend on
the characteristics of the counterparty. A counterparty to an option, for example, can seize collateral
only if it is a "commodity broker, forward contract merchant, stockbroker, financial institution, or
securities clearing agency." §362(b)(6). In contrast, any counterparty to a swap agreement can seize
collateral. For closer analysis of these provisions, see Harold S. Novikoff, Special Bankruptcy Code
Protections for Derivative and Other Financial Market Transactions (2002) (working paper, on file
with author).
20
See § 362(b)(6), (7), (17). The Code contains additional provisions that protect the
counterparty's right to terminate contracts and seize collateral. First, the counterparty's contractual
right to terminate the contract when the debtor becomes insolvent is not treated as a voidable "ipso
facto" clause. §§ 555-556, 559-560. Second, a debtor's eve-of-bankruptcy margin payments to a
counterparty are not considered either preferential, § 546(c), (f), (g), or fraudulent, § 548(d)(2)(B),
(C), (D), provided the payments were not intentionally fraudulent. For in-depth analysis of these
provisions, see Novikoff, supranote 19.
21
§ 362.
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forward contracts, commodity contracts, repos, and swaps. Counterparties to a
derivatives securities contract with a debtor in bankruptcy may now terminate
or modify it and then liquidate the debtor's assets irrespective of whether the
debtor is actually in default under the contract. Further, if counterparties hold
other assets of the debtor they can typically effect an "offset" so long as they can
enforce their rights against such assets without having to require the assistance
of the debtor. Thus, in general, the rights of counterparties to derivatives
transactions with respect to collateral and its liquidation are derived from the
contract or agreement between the protected party and the debtor, as opposed to
the Bankruptcy Code.
The exceptions are set to grow. Recently proposed legislation would,
among other things, extend the bankruptcy stay exemption to a wide variety of
equity and credit derivatives transactions, and would further extend the rights
of counterparties to enforce netting arrangements documented under the
International Swaps and Derivatives Association (ISDA) Master Agreements.
Specifically, it would allow counterparties to set-off their obligations and rights
under swap and repo agreements, on the one hand, against their obligations and
rights under securities and forward contracts, on the other. 24 Under current law,
it is unclear whether such "cross-product netting" is permissible; the Code
explicitly permits cross-product netting of only securities contracts, forward
contracts, and commodity contracts.25
Why are derivatives contracts treated differently? If legislative history is to
26
Congress reasoned that special treatment of derivatives was
be credited,
necessary to prevent the "insolvency of one commodity firm from spreading to
other brokers or clearing agencies and possibly threatening the collapse of the
market."" It believed that: "The prompt liquidation of an insolvent's position
is generally desirable to minimize the potentially massive losses and chain
reaction of insolvencies that could occur if the market were to move sharply in
the wrong direction."2 8 Congress, then, carved derivatives out of the scope of
the automatic stay in order to reduce the likelihood of systemic risk, i.e., the
possibility that the insolvency of a party to a derivatives contract might expose

See, e.g., Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2004, S. 1920,
22
108th Cong. § 907 (2004); Financial Contracts Bankruptcy Reform Act of 2003, H.R. 2120, 108th
Cong. § 8 (2003).
The proposed legislation would, for example, expand the definitions of "forward
23
contract," "repurchase agreement," "swap agreement," and "securities agreement" to encompass a
wider array of financial instruments. See S. 1920 § 907(a).
24
See id. § 907(d). For a helpful overview of the proposed legislation, see Kenneth N. Klee
& Daniel J. Bussell, The Bankruptcy Abuse and Prevention Act of 2003-Business Bankruptcy
Amendments WL SH054 ALI-ABA I (May 2003).
11 U.S.C. § 362(b)(6); see also Klee & Bussell, supra note 24; Novikoff, supra note 19.
25
26
The origins of the legislation could, of course, be explored using public choice theory.
We do not undertake this line of analysis here, largely because we are concerned with efficiencybased justifications for the Code's special treatment of derivatives contracts.
27
H.R. RaP. No. 97-420, at 2 (1982).
28
Id. at4.

HeinOnline -- 22 Yale J. on Reg. 97 2005

Yale Journal on Regulation

Vol. 22:91, 2005

a counterparty (such as a commercial or investment bank) and that
counterparty's counterparties (other banking institutions) to financial distress,
which would destabilize financial markets.
Congress' concern with systemic risk has some basis. Fear that a
counterparty insolvency could trigger a systemic meltdown in the "over-the-

counter" (OTC) derivatives market29 stems partly from the fact that this huge0
market is dominated by a few large international banks and securities firms.
At year-end 2002, for example, the notional value of interest-rate, credit, and

equity derivatives amounted to over $140 trillion, with a gross market value of
about $6.4 trillion. 31 During that same year, the ten largest OTC derivatives
dealers were counterparties to most of the derivatives transactions that took
place, and seven U.S. banks held over 95% of the U.S. banking system's
notional derivatives exposure.32 This raises the possibility that a problem (such
as insolvency) with a major derivatives dealer (i.e., a commercial or investment
bank) could reverberate throughout the entire OTC derivatives market and cause
financial distress far beyond derivatives markets.

While Congress'

concern with systemic risk is understandable, its

decision to address it through the Bankruptcy Code is deeply puzzling. At the

very least, the language of the Code encompasses far too many transactions.
Fear of systemic risk is warranted only in cases involving the insolvency of a
major financial market participant, with whom other firms have entered

derivatives contracts of massive value and volume. Yet the Code offers special
treatment to derivatives no matter how large or small the counterparty. Thus,
Congress' stated justification for the special treatment is incomplete, as it

applies only to a fraction of all firms that enter into derivatives contracts.
At the same time, the Code's special treatment of derivatives contracts
seems far too narrow. Fear of systemic risk justifies special treatment of a broad
29
An "over-the-counter" market is one where trading is done outside of an organized
exchange, such as the New York Stock Exchange or the Chicago Board of Trade. In an OTC market,
traders deal by phone and computer. See generally HULL, supra note 4.
30
See generally Franklin R_ Edwards, OTC Derivatives Markets and Financial Fragility, J.
FIN. SERVS. RES. (Dec. 1995).
31

See BANK FOR INT'L SETTLEMENTS, INTERNATIONAL BANKING AND FINANCIAL MARKET

DEVELOPMENTS (2004), available at http://www.bis.org/publ/quarterly.htm (last visited, Nov. 4, 2004).
Notional value is a standard measure of market size and is equal to the aggregate "notional principal"
employed in derivatives contracts (adjusted for double-counting). Suppose, for example, that party A
enters an interest rate swap with party B. The parties will agree to make periodic payments for a
limited period to each other. Each party's payment will be based on a stated interest rate applied to a
particular principal amount (the "notional principal"). Party A, for example, may agree to pay a
variable ("floating") market-based interest rate (say, three-month LIBOR) with respect to a notional
principle of $100 million. Party B will agree to pay a "fixed" rate (say, 3%) with respect to the same
principal amount. The notional principal is $100 million, but that sum will never change hands. Only
the interest payments will be made. As a result, notional principal overstates the size of derivatives
markets. An alternative measure is "gross market value," which measures the replacement cost of
outstanding derivatives contracts. See, e.g., Stulz, supra note 5, at 177-79; see also Press Release, Bank
for International Settlements, Acceleration of OTC Derivatives Market Activity in the First Half of
2002 (Nov. 8, 2002), available at http://www.bis.org/publ/otchy02 11.pdf (last visited Dec. 5, 2004).
32
U.S. OFFICE OF TIlE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, OCC BANK DERIVATIVES REPORT,
SECOND QUARTER 2002, at 1 (2002).
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range of financial market transactions and participants, especially commercial
banks. Indeed, fear of systemic risk originated in the banking sector, yet a bank
cannot seize collateral whenever a debtor firm enters bankruptcy. Surely the
risks that (apparently) motivated Congress' concern with derivatives are equally
present when Enron, WorldCom, or United Airlines enters bankruptcy and,
say, Chase Manhattan cannot collect its collateral (if it is a secured creditor) or
expects only a few cents on the dollar (if it is unsecured) when the case
concludes several years later. Yet nothing in the Code allows Chase to collect
its collateral; nothing in the Code gives Chase or any other bank priority in
payment when the case concludes. If systemic risk arises from transactions other
than derivatives contracts, as it undoubtedly does, the Code's singular focus on
derivatives contracts is puzzling.33
It might be argued that this singular focus merely reflects the reality that
commercial banks are subject to federal regulation while many derivatives
counterparties are not. We do not fear a systemic collapse when Chase is unable
to collect collateral from Enron because, thanks to capital requirements and
other regulatory and supervisory constraints, Chase is unlikely to become
financially distressed. This argument is troubling for two reasons. First, it
seems odd to regulate some financial institutions directly (through capital
requirements and the like) and others indirectly (through the Bankruptcy Code).
The costs of direct regulation are borne by the institution itself, the costs of
indirect regulation through the Code are borne by other creditors of a distressed
firm. More importantly, it seems highly unlikely that the Code is an effective
means of reducing systemic risk, as we show in the next section.
II.

Can the Bankruptcy Code Reduce Systemic Risk?

An answer to this question was suggested recently during the nearcollapse of LTCM, which was founded in 1994. 34 LTCM was highly leveraged
and its operations in derivatives markets were broad and complex. While
approximately 80% of LTCM's balance sheet positions were in seemingly safe
treasury securities of major industrial countries, these were highly leveraged, at
a ratio of 28-to-1 on-balance sheet as of August 31, 1998. LTCM's off-balance
sheet leverage was much greater. As of August 31, 1998, it held derivatives of
about $1.4 trillion in notional value, even though it had only $4.1 billion in
capital as of July 31, 1998. LTCM held OTC swap contracts with a gross

33
The puzzle, of course, may simply reflect lobbying efforts of special interest groups, such
as ISDA, which desire special treatment of derivatives regardless of its effects on social welfare. As
noted, supra note 26, we are interested in efficiency-based justifications for the special treatment and
put aside (at least for purposes of this paper) public choice-based accounts.
34
For a discussion of LTCM and the Federal Reserve-led creditor rescue of LTCM, see
Franklin R. Edwards, Hedge Funds and the Collapse of Long Term Capital Management, 13 J. ECON.
PERSP. 189 (1999).
35
PRES[DENT'S WoRKiNG GROUP ON FIN. MKTS., HEDGE FUNDS, LEVERAGE, AND THE
LESSONS OF LONG-TERM CAPITAL MANAGEMENT

11-12 (1999);

U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE,
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notional value in excess of $750 billion, futures contracts with a gross notional
value in excess of $500 billion, and options and other derivatives with a
notional value in excess of $150 billion. It is estimated that LTCM had
between 20,000 and 60,000• trades
on its
36 books, and more than seventy-five
counterparties to its derivatives contracts.
After a series of large losses, by September 1998 LTCM had lost 50% of
its equity and was in danger of not being able to meet the collateral obligations
on its derivatives positions. Only the timely intervention of the Federal
Reserve in organizing a creditor-bailout of LTCM prevented LTCM's default
and collapse. A consortium of 14 banks and securities firms, the large creditors
of LTCM, recapitalized LTCM to the tune of $3.6 billion and took over the
responsibility and obligations of resolving LTCM's financial difficulties. In
essence, LTCM's large counterparties participated in a Federal Reserveorganized out-of-court "work-out" for LTCM. Why was the intervention of the
Federal Reserve necessary to do what one might expect could be done under
standard bankruptcy law?
In explaining the role of the Federal Reserve, William McDonough, the
president of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, stated that it was the
Federal Reserve's judgment that the "abrupt and disorderly close-out of
LTCM's 3?ositions would pose unacceptable risks to the American
economy." According to McDonough, the rush of more than seventy-five
counterparties to close out simultaneously hundreds of billions of dollars of
derivatives contracts would have adversely affected many market participants
with no connection to LTCM and would have resulted in tremendous
uncertainty about how far prices might move. According to MeDonough,
"[u]nder these circumstances, there was a likelihood that a number of credit and
interest rate markets would experience extreme price moves and possibly cease
to function for a period of one or more days and maybe longer. This would
have caused a vicious cycle: a loss of investor confidence, leading to further
liquidations of positions, and so on."'38 (At the time LTCM's own estimate
was that its largest seventeen counterparties, in closing out their positions with
LTCM, would have incurred losses in the aggregate of between U.S. $3 billion
and U.S. $5 billion, with some individual firms losing as much as $500
million. 39)

LONG-TERM CAPITAL MANAGEMENT: REGULATORS NEED TO FocUs GREATER ATTENTION ON
SYSTEMIC RISK 7 (1999).
36
PRESIDENT'S WORKING GROUP ON FIN. MKTS, supra note 35, at 11-12; U.S. GEN.
ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 35, at 7.

37
Hedge Fund Operations: Hearing Before the House Comm. on Banking and Fin. Servs.,
105th Cong. 5 (1998) (statement of William McDonough, President, Federal Reserve Bank of New
York).
38
Id.
39
See Paul N. Roth & Brian H. Fortune, Hedge Fund Regulation in the Aftermath of LongTerm Capital Management, in HEDGE FUNDS: LAW AND REGULATION 109 (lain Cullen & Helen Parry
eds., 2001).
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At the root of the Federal Reserve's concern was the current U.S.
insolvency law.40 As we have seen, the Bankruptcy Code exempts derivatives
counterparties from the normal operation of the automatic stay. Thus, if LTCM
had filed a bankruptcy petition, its derivatives counterparties would have been
fire to terminate and liquidate their contracts with LTCM. And each
counterparty would have surely done this, because the sale price of the
underlying collateral would have been higher and the cost of rebalancing a
portfolio of derivatives contracts would have been lower for the first parties to
terminate their contracts with LTCM. A counterparty that was slow to
terminate a contract would have found that the sale price of its collateral had
fallen dramatically (because other counterparties would have already sold off
their collateral en masse). The counterparty would have also found it very
difficult to rebalance its portfolio. For every contract with LTCM, the
counterparty would have entered into a variety of "hedging" transactions that
counterbalanced the risk associated with the contract. After terminating that
contract, the counterparty would have needed to take steps to rebalance its
portfolio (perhaps by finding a replacement for the original LTCM contract).
Rebalancing is very costly in an environment where every other counterparty is
trying to do precisely the same thing.
If LTCM's counterparties had taken steps to terminate and liquidate their
derivatives contracts, the effects would have been analogous to a "bank run" on
LTCM's assets, possibly resulting in the systemic ramifications articulated by
Federal Reserve officials. As economists have argued recently, bank runs can
cause or exacerbate liquidity shortages, resulting in systemic illiquidity with
the potential to cause widespread contagion. 41 A run by derivatives
counterparties of the kind that could have occurred in the LTCM episode seems
similar to a bank run in that it too could have resulted in the immediate and
widespread liquidation of assets at firesale prices.
In contrast, the financial instability that (Congress feared) might arise if
derivatives transactions are not exempt from the automatic stay seems less
systemic in nature and less likely to destabilize financial markets. Congress
worried that losses by a derivatives counterparty could trigger a chain reaction
of insolvencies by making it impossible for a counterparty experiencing losses
to meet its obligations to other counterparties. In general, this is implausible.
Although a derivatives counterparty may suffer significant losses if it is unable
quickly to terminate and close out its positions with a financially-stressed
counterparty, this is also true for most other creditors of the firm (those subject
to the automatic stay provision). In this sense derivatives counterparties seem

40
Cayman Islands' bankruptcy law was also a concern, because LTCM's sole general
partner was a Cayman Islands limited partnership. The Fed analyzed the implications of bankruptcy
filings both in the U.S. and abroad. See PRESIDENT'S WORKING GROUP ON FIN. MKTS., supra note 35, at
app. E (1999).
41
Douglas Diamond & Raghuram Rajan, Liquidity Shortages and Banking Crises (August
2003) (working paper, on file with authors).
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no different from other creditors, and we rarely worry about a chain reaction of
insolvencies when, say, United Airlines defaults on obligations to its vendors.
A "chain reaction of insolvencies" might, however, be worrisome in two
situations. One is where a distressed counterparty is a particularly large player
in the market and suffers distress as a result of unanticipated economic turmoil
that reduces market liquidity. LTCM's distress, for example, was precipitated
by Russia's devaluation of the ruble and declaration of a debt moratorium in
August 1998. 4' This unexpected event led to a so-called "flight" to liquidity
and quality: investors sold-off or avoided high-risk, illiquid financial products
and gravitated toward safer, more liquid instruments, sharply increasing yield
spreads. LTCM suffered massive losses as yield spreads widened around
43 the
world, and found itself on the verge of default in a highly illiquid market.
Suppose that LTCM had filed a bankruptcy petition and, thanks to the
Code's special treatment of derivatives contracts, its counterparties had closed
out their contracts and seized collateral. Would this have avoided the risk of a
"chain reaction" of insolvencies? No. Indeed, it would have exacerbated the
risk. As one of us has explained elsewhere, 44 wholesale liquidation of LTCM's
assets would have benefited few counterparties (prices would have collapsed
long before most had a chance to liquidate their positions) and could have had
serious "knock-on" effects because other counterparties and other financial firms
held positions similar to LTCM's. Thus, counterparties could have suffered
large losses and been forced to default on their own obligations to other parties,
resulting in precisely the same "chain reaction of insolvencies" that Congress
sought to avoid by exempting derivatives from the stay. This explains why
LTCM's counterparties did not attempt to close out their positions and seize
collateral when LTCM entered financial distress. Instead, with encouragement
from the Fed, they put an additional $3.6 billion into LTCM to ensure that it
remained solvent so that they would have time to unwind LTCM's derivatives
positions in an orderly fashion. For the counterparties, the additional
investment in a failing LTCM was obviously viewed as less costly than the
expected losses from the wholesale liquidation of LTCM's positions and
collateral. As the President's Working Group on Financial Markets put it,
"[t]he self-interest of these firms was to find an alternative45 resolution that cost
less than they could expect to lose in the event of default.'
A chain reaction of insolvencies may also be a possibility if the distressed
counterparty is a particularly large player in the market and counterparties
generally failed to employ sound risk management procedures when dealing
with the distressed counterparty. Derivatives counterparties, like all other
creditors, have strong incentives to manage their credit risks prudently so that

42
See Edwards, supra note 34, at 199-200.
43
Id.
44
Id. at 202.
45
PREStDENT'S WORKNG GRoup ON FIN. MKTS, supra note 35, at 13. See also Edwards,
supra note 34, at 202.

HeinOnline -- 22 Yale J. on Reg. 102 2005

Derivatives and the Bankruptcy Code

losses do not cause them financial distress. The insolvency of a small
derivatives counterparty should not result in a "chain reaction" effect because
losses will be small, and even the insolvency of a large counterparty like
LTCM should not have this effect unless its counterparties behaved
imprudently in their dealings with the distressed counterparty (which may have
been the case with LTCM). 46 But the solution to this failure is better risk
management by counterparties, not amendments to the Bankruptcy Code
exempting derivatives counterparties from its automatic stay provisions. Or, in
the case of banks and other regulated financial institutions-which constitute
the major derivatives counterparties in OTC derivatives markets-the answer
should be either better supervision or a regulatory structure that increases
incentives to manage counterparty risk more effectively.
Thus, one view of the potential for LTCM to have caused a systemic
crisis is that this crisis was precipitated by the very provisions of the
Bankruptcy Code that were designed to assure stability in derivatives markets.
Had these provisions not been adopted, it is very likely that there would not
have been either an "abrupt and disorderly close-out of LTCM's positions" or
an "unwinding [of] LTCM's portfolio in a forced liquidation." There probably
would have been no need for the Federal Reserve to intervene to prevent a
"seizing up of markets ... [that] could have potentially impaired the
economies of many nations, including our own." While counterparties of
LTCM might have suffered losses had they been stayed by the Code, it is
unlikely that these losses would have been large enough to bring down large
banks and securities firms. If they had been stayed by the Code, LTCM's
major creditors almost certainly would have opted to facilitate a bankruptcysupervised creditor "work-out" by putting in more capital and reorganizing the
ownership structure of LTCM, just as they did under the Federal Reserve
arranged work-out. Indeed, as subsequent events showed, it was clearly in the
collective interest of LTCM's counterparties and creditors to avoid a "run" on
LTCM and the accompanying firesale of its assets. Thus, in the absence of the
Bankruptcy Code's special treatment of derivatives, Fed intervention may have
been unnecessary.
LTCM is not the only large-scale derivatives counterparty to suffer
financial distress. Indeed, an even more spectacular failure occurred recently in
the form of Enron, which dominated many energy derivatives markets. One
scholar estimates that Enron made more money trading derivatives during the
year 2000 than LTCM made in its entire history-if we believe Enron's 2001

46
Available evidence suggests that LTCM's counterparties did indeed behave imprudently
(by, for example, extending credit at below-market rates and by entering under-collateralized
derivatives contracts without verifying the scale or scope of LTCM's trading operations). See, e.g.,
PRESIDENT'S WORKING GROUP ON FIN. MKTS., supra note 35, at 14-17; U.S. GEN. AcCOUNTNG
OFFICE, supra note 35, at 10-12 (1999); see also Edwards, supra note 34, at 204-05.
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10-K. 47 Unlike LTCM, the federal government did not intervene to help Enron
as it entered financial distress (despite lobbying efforts by the firm's bankers).48
Unlike LTCM, Enron did file a Chapter 11 petition. And in stark contrast to
the Fed's expectations in LTCM, Enron's bankruptcy did not destabilize either
energy derivatives markets or financial markets generally.
49
5
This was, to many observers, a surprising outcome.' s Indeed, the
absence of systemic effects in the wake of a major counterparty's collapse might
be seen as evidence that the Code's special treatment of derivatives worked as

intended. The International Swaps and Derivatives Association (ISDA) has
made precisely this argument: 51 counterparties were free to terminate contracts
and seize collateral, thereby minimizing losses. The result might also be seen
as evidence that the Fed's concerns in LTCM were misplaced: just as in.
Enron, LTCM's collapse would not have destabilized financial markets.
But Enron's insolvency presented fundamentally different issues than
LTCM's. First, it is not true that Enron's failure had little effect on financial

markets. Liquidity in energy markets and many specialized markets (such as
telecommunications bandwidth trading) collapsed in the wake of the bankruptcy
filing.52 What is true, however, is that this collapse was not as severe as that
experienced in the LTCM crisis. Also, LTCM's insolvency was driven by

mounting losses in its derivatives positions, while Enron's insolvency was
driven by sustained and increasing losses in its core non-financial businesseslosses that were covered up by a massive accounting fraud. If its annual reports
offer any guidance, Enron's derivatives trading arm was its only profitable
operation. Enron indicated, post-petition, that its derivatives trading business

47
Frank Partnoy, Enron and the Derivatives World, in ENRON: CORPORATE FIASCOS AND
THEIR IMPLICATIONS 169 (Nancy B. Rapoport & Bala G. Dharan eds., 2004).
STAFF OF SENATE COMM. ON GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS, 107th CONG., ENRON'S CREDIT
48
RATING: ENRON'S BANKERS' CONTACTS WITH MOODY'S AND GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS (Comm. Print
2003).
See, e.g., Upended: The Imminent Bankruptcy of Enron Could Destabilise Energy and
49
Financial Markets Around the World, ECONOMIST.COM, Nov. 30, 2001 (predicting that Enron's
imminent collapse would resemble the LTCM debacle).
50
See, e.g., Susan Lee, The Dismal Science: Enron's Success Story, WALL ST. J., Dec. 26,
2001, at All ("At the end of September, Enron had 25% of the energy-trading market. Just two
months later, its business had disappeared but that disappearance didn't cause the tiniest ripple in the
market. The swift collapse of what once was a $77 billion dollar company failed to generate either a
price spike or a supply interruption because the market was sufficiently liquid and deep to absorb it.");
A Fresh Look at Rules for Energy and Finance, FIN. TIMES, Feb. 19, 2002, at 19; see also Jacqueline
Lang Weaver, Can Energy Markets Be Trusted? The Effect of the Rise and Fall of Enron on Energy
Markets, 4 HOUSTON BUS. & TAX L.J. 1, 24-25 (2004).
See CFTC Oversight of Derivatives Markers: Hearing Before the Senate Comm. on
51
Agric., Nutrition and Forestry, 107th Cong. (2002) (statement of Ernest T. Patrikis on behalf of the
International Swaps and Derivatives Association); INT'L SWAPS & DERIVATIVES ASS'N, ENRON:
CORPORATE FAILURE, MARKET SUCCESS (2002).
52
INT'L SwAPs & DERIVATIVES ASS'N,, RESTORING CONFIDENCE IN U.S. ENERGY TRADING
MARKETS 9 (2003).

53
See Partoy, supra note 47, at 183 (making this point and reproducing data from Enron's
2000 income statement).
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accounted for the "lion's share" of its income 4 Before and after Enron filed its
bankruptcy petition in December 2001, many derivatives counterparties with
in-the-money contracts with Enron canceled these contracts and seized
collateral. 55 But many counterparties had out-of-the-money contracts and Enron
immediately took steps to collect amounts owed to it ("termination
payments").16 These amounts totaled over $3 billion as of November 2003 (an
additional $2.2 billion was sought in litigation against counterparties that
terminated contracts that, in Enron's view, were disguised loans). 57 More
importantly, Enron's derivatives trading arm continued operating despite the
firm's Chapter 11 filing, and the firm moved" quickly to sell the operation to a
third-party (ultimately to UBS Warburg 59), thereby minimizing disruption to

OTC markets.
For these reasons the collapse of Enron seems much different from the
collapse of LTCM. Enron's bankruptcy filing did indeed create a "counterparty
run" that consumed assets, but the effect of this run was limited by the fact that
Enron's trading operations were, it seems, somewhat profitable: some
counterparties (with in-the-money positions) were free to seize Enron assets, but
another large group of counterparties (with out-of-the-money positions) found
themselves liable to Enron. There was no wholesale run on Enron's assets, and
no firesale of assets. Although Enron's collapse did create a liquidity vacuum
in certain energy derivatives markets, it did not threaten liquidity in overall
financial markets-something the Fed feared in the LTCM crisis. 6 ° Put
differently, Enron's collapse did not pose a risk of a systemic meltdown. Its
insolvency, therefore, neither supports nor undermines ISDA's claim that the
Code's special treatment of derivatives minimizes systemic risk nor our claim
that the Code can, in some cases, exacerbate systemic risk.
In sum, then, the LTCM episode suggests that the most important risk to
financial stability may come from the possibility that derivatives counterparties,
exempt from the automatic stay provisions of the Bankruptcy Code, may "run"
on a financially distressed firm (or firms), causing a liquidity shortage that has
the potential to spill over to other firms and markets and cause widespread
54
Response and Objection of Exco Resources, Inc. at 3, In re Enron Corp., No. 01-16034
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Jan. 8, 2002).
55
See Emergency Motion for an Order Pursuant to Sections 105 and 363 of the Bankruptcy
Code and Rule 9019(b) of the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure for Authority to Negotiate and
Enter into Termination or Sale Agreements with Counterparties to Certain "Safe Harbor" Contracts
Without Further Court Approval, In re Enron Corp., No. 01 -16034 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Dec. 10, 2001).
56
Id.
57
Disclosure Statement for Fifth Amended Joint Plan of Affiliated Debtors Pursuant to
Chapter 11 of the United States Code In re Enron Corp., No. 01-16034 at236-37 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.
Jan. 9, 2004).
58
Motion of Enron Corp. (to Sell Wholesale Trading Business], In re Enron Corp., No. 0116034 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Dec. 14, 2001).
59
Order Pursuant to Sections 105, 363, and 365 of the Bankruptcy Code [Approving Sale of
Wholesale Trading Arm toUBS Warburg], In re Enron Corp., No. 01-16034 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Jan.
22, 2004).
60

PRESIDENT'S WORKING GROUP ON FIN. MKTS., supra note 35, at 17-22.
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instability in financial markets. In contrast, in the absence of a systemic
liquidity shortage, there is no reason to think that derivatives counterparties
could not adequately manage their counterparty risks or could not absorb
counterparty losses without triggering a chain reaction of insolvencies.
Does this mean that the Code's special treatment of derivatives contracts
is a mistake? Are derivatives contracts no different from other contracts and
assets of a troubled firm? Not necessarily; in the next section we offer an
alternative justification for the Code's treatment of derivatives. The real lesson
to draw from the LTCM episode, however, is that the systemic risk rationale
for exempting derivatives contracts does not make much sense. A Bankruptcy
Code exemption for derivatives offers little help in alleviating the potential
systemic risk associated with the insolvency of a large derivatives counterparty
like LTCM, and may even exacerbate or create a systemic risk. The better
approach to mitigating possible systemic risk from a derivatives counterparty
failure is to increase incentives for counterparties and creditors to use better risk
management procedures, either by enhancing market discipline or by more
eflective regulatory oversight of regulated financial institution counterparties.
But in the event of a market failure, central bank intervention may be the only
recourse.
11.

A Better Reason for Treating Derivatives Differently

Derivatives contracts are different. To see why, we need to review the
theoretical foundations for the automatic stay. The stay serves the same
purposes as government regulation of common pool resources and other
externality-creating activities. As others have noted, a firm in distress is
analogous to a scarce resource (e.g., fish in a lake) to which users have
unlimited, non-exclusive rights of access. 62 In the absence of regulation or the
creation of exclusive property rights, the resource will be overused. The first
user to exploit the resource will be satisfied, the last will not; therefore, every
user rushes to consume the resource first. This will be true even if the resource
would have more value per user if exploited in a more restrained fashion.
Unsecured creditors have similar incentives to descend upon the limited
assets of a distressed firm. The first creditor to reach state court and obtain a
judgment lien will be paid in full; later creditors will be paid a few cents on the
dollar. Thus every creditor rushes to dismember the firm, to the disadvantage of
all creditors. Even when this rush to the courthouse does not result in
premature dismemberment of a firm (perhaps the firm plans to liquidate), it is
nonetheless wasteful. Every creditor incurs legal costs trying to monitor other
creditors in order to ensure that it is first (or at least not last) in line for

61
In this context, "externality-creating" activities are those that may indirectly impose costs
on other creditors of the firm.
62

See, e.g.,

THOMAS H. JACKSON, THE LOGIC AND LIMITS OF BANKRUPTCY LAW 10-13

(1986).
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repayment when the debtor becomes insolvent.63 The automatic stay prevents
this destructive race, thereby preserving firms with going concern value and
reducing creditor collection costs.
Secured creditors, on the other hand, would seem to have little incentive
to take part in this race. They have obtained exclusive rights to particular assets
64
of the debtor, i.e., collateral. Yet the automatic stay applies to them too. If

Bank loaned $1 million to Debtor and took a security interest in Debtor's
machinery as collateral, the automatic stay prevents Bank from seizing the
machinery when Debtor stops repaying the loan and files a bankruptcy petition.65

viability.
This is because the machines may be essential to Debtor's
Removal of collateral benefits the secured creditor but harms other creditors by

destroying firm value. Bank ignores this harm to other creditors because "ithas

nothing to gain from waiting and attempting to keep the firm intact, but...

66
can do worse if the firm continues and its fortunes decline." Thus, even a
secured creditor has strong incentives to remove collateral, creating an

externality vis-A-vis other creditors of the debtor firm. The automatic stay
limits this externality much as environmental regulation limits environmental
externalities.

This is the traditional view of the automatic stay, which is grounded in a
traditional view of Chapter 11: troubled firms use Chapter 11 to establish a
collective proceeding that preserves firms with going concern surplus and

reduces creditor collection costs. Recent scholarship questions this view of
Chapter 11 and suggests that, in modem practice, Chapter 11 is primarily a
vehicle for selling assets or implementing capital restructuring plans devised by
a majority of creditors.67 Outside of Chapter 11, these goals may be difficult or
impossible to achieve. 6t Under this revisionist view, the automatic stay

See, e.g, Robert K. Rasmussen, Bankruptcy and the Administrative State, 42 HASTINGS
63
L.J. 1567, 1573-74 (1991).
See II U.S.C. § 362(a)(5) (2000) (prohibiting "any act to create, perfect, or enforce
64
against property of the debtor any lien to the extent that such lien secures a claim that arose before the
commencement of the case under this title").
See generally Douglas G. Baird & Thomas H. Jackson, Corporate Reorganizationsand
65
the Treatment of Diverse Ownership Interests: A Comment on Adequate Protection of Secured
Creditorsin Bankruptcy, 51 U. CHI. L. REv. 97, 116-21 (1984), JACKSON, supra note 62, at 181-83.
Baird & Jackson, supra note 65, at 106.
66
Douglas G. Baird & Robert K. Rasmussen, The End of Bankruptcy, 55 STAN. L. REV. 751
67
(2002).
Asset sales outside of bankruptcy are problematic because the seller's creditors may
68
claim that the sale was a de facto merger of the buyer and seller, meaning that the buyer assumed the
seller's liabilities when itpurchased the seller's assets. This problem is avoided in bankruptcy because,
under 11 U.S.C. § 363 (2000), assets are sold free and clear of creditor claims. Similarly, capital
restructuring outside of bankruptcy is difficult because, under the federal Trust Indenture Act, the
most important terms of a bond indenture (interest and principal) cannot be altered without unanimous
consent of all bondholders. This problem is avoided in bankruptcy because, under section 1129, debt
can be restructured with the consent of creditors holding two-thirds in value and a majority in number
of the claims in each class. Even if such consent is absent, restructuring may still be possible.
Dissenting creditors can be "crammed down" under certain conditions. See Baird & Rasmussen, supra
note 67, at 786-88.
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functions simply to prevent actions (by the debtor or its creditors) that might
disrupt a proposed sale or agreed-upon restructuring. This account of the

automatic stay differs from the traditional account only in cases where creditor
conduct might disrupt, say, a proposed sale but would neither induce a costly
rush to the courthouse nor generate other externalities. Such cases are probably

rare; it is hard to identify creditor conduct that would harm a firm's sale value
but not its going-concern value, or would benefit the individual creditor but not
generate costly competition
69
advantage.
A.

among other creditors to obtain

the same

General Limits on the Stay

The foregoing view of the Bankruptcy Code suggests natural limitations
on the scope of the automatic stay: the stay should exempt creditor collection
efforts that raise no common-resource problem or other externalities that reduce
the debtor's going-concern value. The Bankruptcy Code does indeed create

exceptions to the automatic stay, and many exceptions fit within the theory
outlined above.
The most important exception is the judge's discretion, under section

362(d), to grant a creditor's motion to terminate the automatic stay with
respect to particular assets. A court may grant the motion either "for cause" or
if the creditor offers proof that the debtor firm has no equity in the asset and that

the asset is "not necessary to an effective reorganization." The automatic stay,
then, creates a rebuttable presumption that a debtor's
assets are firm-specific and
70
therefore "necessary to an effctive reorganization."
Beyond this general exception to the stay, there are many specific

exceptions targeting particular creditors or particular assets. As we noted
previously, the stay does not extend to the government's police or regulatory
power. A debtor cannot avoid criminal prosecution or the enforcement of

69
We are assuming, as do many others, that the primary goals of bankruptcy law are to
maximize creditor recovery ex post by preserving firms with going concern surplus (i.e., firms worth
more intact than sold piecemeal) and to encourage investment ex ante. See Alan Schwartz, A
Normative Theory of Business Bankruptcy (Apr. 2004) (working paper, on file with author).
Alternative goals could be proposed: the law might serve to reduce creditor collection costs through a
collective proceeding in a single federal court (instead of multiple proceedings brought by individual
creditors in various state courts), or the law might be thought to distribute losses in a manner that
promotes particular social policies (e.g., favoring employees who are "ill-suited to bear the costs of
default" over secured creditors who anticipated default). Elizabeth Warren, Bankruptcy Policy, 54 U.
CM. L. REV. 775, 790 (1987). We ignore these goals for two reasons. First, bankruptcy law will play
an important role in reducing creditor collection costs only in cases where creditor collection efforts
generate a common-resource problem. If a firm is insolvent, creditors will race to dismember the firm.
Bankruptcy law will prevent this destructive race and, at the same time, reduce collection costs. If a
firm is solvent (or not expected to become insolvent), creditors have little or no incentive to dismember
the firm. Second, like many other scholars, we suspect that bankruptcy is a poor vehicle for promoting
social welfare policies. See generally Schwartz, supra; Douglas G. Baird, Bankruptcy's Uncontested
Axioms, 108 YALE L.J. 573 (1998); Robert K. Rasmussen, An Essay on Optimal Bankruptcy Rules and
Social Justice, 1994 U. ILL. L. REV. I (1994).
70
11 U.S.C. § 362 (d)(l), (2).
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environmental protection laws, and a troubled educational institution cannot
prevent accrediting agencies from reevaluating the institution's eligibility for
state funding. 7' In these situations, the government is acting as regulator, not
creditor, and is therefore not attempting to gain an advantage over other
creditors. Although the government's efforts may reduce firm value to the
detriment of all creditors (e.g., an order to remediate polluted land), the
reduction in value is the unavoidable result of compliance with laws unrelated
to debt collection. On the other hand, when the government's regulatory efforts
become debt-collection efforts (as when the state seeks compensation for prepetition remediation efforts), the automatic stay steps into place .
Another exception to the automatic stay ensures that the Bankruptcy Code
does not alter the substantive state-law rights of one creditor vis-A-vis others.
Consider Vendor that sold equipment to Debtor on credit; to ensure repayment,
the sale agreement gave Vendor a security interest in the equipment. If Vendor
"perfects" its security interest by making a prompt filing with the appropriate
state official (usually the secretary of state), Vendor will enjoy priority with
respect to this collateral over all other creditors, including those with perfected
security interests in it. What if Debtor files a bankruptcy petition after receiving

the equipment but before Vendor has perfected its security interest? Although
the automatic stay would generally prevent Vendor from taking steps to perfect
its interest, section 362(b)(3) creates an exception: provided Debtor filed the
petition only a few days after receiving the equipment, Vendor may perfect its
security interest by filing a financing statement with the appropriate public
official.73 This rule ensures that Vendor has the same right to perfect a security
interest in bankruptcy that it would have enjoyed outside of bankruptcy. 74 More
importantly, this exception to the automatic stay permits acts that generate
neither common-pool problems nor other externalities that reduce finn value.
When Vendor perfects a security interest, it is merely announcing rights to
collateral pursuant to a pre-petition contract. There is no rush to seize assets;
there is no adverse effect on the viability of the firm.
Other exceptions make clear that the automatic stay has no effect on
creditor efforts to reach property that is not part of the debtor's estate. Thus, a
creditor may present a check or other negotiable instrument to the debtor, have
it dishonored, and then seek payment from a guarantor. 75 And a landlord may

71
§ 362(b)(1), (4), (14), (15), (16) (2003).
72
See, e.g., Ohio v. Kovacs, 469 U.S. 274 (1985). More generally, see the discussion in
Rasmussen, supra note 69, at 1596-160273
This narrow exception is available only to suppliers who sold goods on credit to the debtor
no more than twenty days before the debtor filed a bankruptcy petition. See 11 U.S.C. § 362(b)(3)
(2000); U.C.C. § 9-317(e) (1999).
74
Outside of bankruptcy, Vendor has twenty days, from the date Debtor receives
possession of the equipment, to file with the secretary of state. It would enjoy the same priority even if
another creditor obtains a security interest in the same collateral and perfects its interest before
Vendor does. U.C.C. § 9-324(a) (1999).
75
11 U.S.C. § 362(b)(1 1) (2000).
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repossess commercial real estate if the terms of the lease have expired; such
76
f
property is not part of the debtor's estate. In each case it is obvious that the
creditor's collection efforts generate neither common-pool problems nor
externalities. The creditors are seizing assets that no longer belong to the
debtor.
B.

Cash and the Automatic Stay

Perhaps the most important limitations on the automatic stay involve
cash and cash equivalents. The Bankruptcy Code freezes any cash, securities, or
other "cash equivalents" in which a creditor has taken a security interest, no
matter where that cash was deposited. Unless the creditor consents-or unless
the court finds good reasons for overcoming the creditor's lack of consent-the
debtor cannot use the "cash collateral."77 At the same time, the creditor cannot
ignore the debtor's interest in the collateral either. The creditor remains
obligated to give the debtor access to the collateral either when the court orders
its return or when the debtor complies with the terms of the underlying
contract.
A similar set of rules govern "setoffs." Frequently a fin and its creditor
have offsetting obligations. A commercial bank will extend a loan to the firm,
which in turn deposits cash in an account at the bank; a landlord will lease real
estate to the firm and the firm will post a deposit; an investment bank will
extend a loan and the firm will pledge securities as collateral. In each case the
firm is indebted to a creditor, but the creditor is also indebted to the firm (the
landlord, for example, must return the deposit if the firm honors the terms of
the lease). And under state law, each has a right of setoff. the creditor may offset
debts owed to the firm against debts owed by the firm. When the firm files a
bankruptcy petition, this right of setoff is only partially limited by the
automatic stay. 78 Although the stay prevents each creditor from exercising its
right of setoff and eliminating the debtor's interest in any cash posted, the
stay nevertheless does permit the creditor to limit the debtor's ability to access
the cash. A commercial bank can freeze the debtor's account, at least
temporarily.80 A landlord (or an investment bank) can retain a deposit (or
margin), unless the debtor proves to the court that the landlord's interest s 2in
access to it.a
the deposit will be "adequately protected" when the debtor gains
§ 362(b)(10).
76
§ 363(c)(2).
77
§ 553(a) ("Except as otherwise provided in this section and in sections 362 and 363 of this
78
title, this title does not affect any right of a creditor to offset a mutual debt owing by such creditor to
the debtor that arose before the commencement of the case under this title against a claim of such
creditor against the debtor that arose before the commencement of the case
§ 362(a)(7).
79
80
Citizens Bank of Md. v. Strumpf, 516 U.S. 16 (1995).
The landlord's interest is limited by § 502(b)(6), which puts a cap on the damages a
81
landlord can claim for breach of a lease of real estate.
82
United States v.Whiting Pools, Inc., 462 U.S. 198, 207 (1983).
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Along the same lines, the automatic stay does not prevent a creditor from
unilaterally terminating a contract to loan money to a debtor firm. Generally,
the stay prevents any contractual partner from terminating ongoing
("executory") contracts with a firm that has filed a bankruptcy petition. The
debtor firm is given the exclusive right-for a limited period-to choose
whether to continue ("assume") or terminate ("reject") ongoing contracts. The
Code, however, carves out an exception for contracts "to make a loan, or
extend other debt financing or financial accommodations, to or for the benefit of
83
the debtor, or to issue a security of the debtor."
The Code's treatment of cash, cash equivalents, and contracts to loan cash
may seem puzzling. After all, a creditor generally cannot place a "freeze" on
collateral. If Bank has taken a security interest in a firm's plant or equipment, it
cannot prevent the firm from using the plant or equipment in its operations.
What distinguishes this example from the previous ones, we believe, is asset
specificity. Plant and equipment may be firm-specific or industry-specific assets.
Cash is never specialized; it is a fungible asset.
This distinction-between specialized and fungible assets-is critical to
84
the economic theory of corporate reorganization. A firm is worth reorganizing
if its assets generate greater value in their current configuration than in a market
sale. This difference is generally called "going concern surplus." It exists,
however, only if the firm's assets are worth more to the firm than to outsiders.
This asymmetry arises when assets are customized to meet a firm's
idiosyncratic needs or the needs of firms in the same industry (examples include
airplanes, railroad tracks, and brewery equipment). These specialized assets
cannot be readily redeployed by other firms (if the assets are firm-specific) or by
firms outside the industry (if they are industry-specific). As a result, plant,
equipment, and other specialized assets are relatively illiquid: there are few
buyers for the assets, and any potential buyers will value the assets significantly
less than the seller does. 8 ' A basic function of bankruptcy law is to protect
these illiquid assets. If creditors could seize and sell these assets, they would
86
fetch firesale prices and the firm's going-concern surplus would be destroyed.

§365(c)(2).
83
We are hardly the first to make this point. For similar arguments, see Viral V. Acharya et
84
al., On the Capital-Structure Implications of Bankruptcy Codes (Mar. 28, 2004) (working paper, on
file with author); Douglas G. Baird & Robert K. Rasmussen, Chapter 11 at Twilight, 56 STAN. L. REv.
673, 685-93 (2003); Baird & Rasmussen, supra note 67, at 768-77.
See Oliver Williamson, Corporate Finance and Corporate Governance, 43 J. FIN. 567
85
(1998), showing the link between asset specificity and corporate finance.
86
Andrei Shleifer & Robert Vishny, Liquidation Values and Debt Capacity: A Market
Equilibrium Approach, 47 J.FIN. 1343 (1992), develop this point. They show that when financial
distress is correlated within an industry, bankruptcy law prevents inefficient liquidation of industryspecific assets. In the absence of bankruptcy law, these assets would be sold at fire-sale prices to
lower-value users outside the industry, the assets will not be purchased by higher-valuing users within
the same industry because they too are suffering distress and are therefore liquidity constrained. For
empirical evidence supporting this theory, see Per Strfmberg, Conflicts of Interest and Market
Illiquidity in Bankruptcy Auctions: Theory and Tests, 55 J.FIN. 2641 (2000); Todd C. Pulvino, Do Asset
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The same cannot be said for cash and other fungible assets. They are
worth as much to the firm as they are to outsiders; a $100 bill is worth $100
whether it is held by the firm or by one of its competitors. Indeed, cash is the
benchmark liquid asset; many financial instruments are nearly as liquid. No
firm derives going concern surplus from its holdings of cash or similarly liquid
instruments (which helps explain why insolvent broker-dealers are liquidated,
not reorganized)." To be sure, the firm may need access to cash in order to run
its operations and preserve going concern surplus. But there is nothing about
cash collateral (cash in which a creditor has rights) that makes it more
important to a firm's survival than cash available from any potential lender. If
the Code allowed a bankrupt firm free access to cash collateral, it would
effectively force creditors to extend new loans to the debtor on non-competitive
terms. But the Code generally does not force loans, and in some cases it does
just the opposite. Thus, under section 365(c)(2), a debtor cannot force lenders
to honor pre-bankruptcy commitments to extend credit. The debtor is forced to
seek credit ("debtor-in-possession financing") on competitive terms.
A puzzle remains, however. Why does the Code merely freeze cash
collateral? The theory developed here suggests that the automatic stay should
allow a secured creditor both to freeze and seize cash collateral when a debtor
seeks bankruptcy protection. The Code, however, not only prohibits the
creditor from seizing the collateral, but also creates an opportunity for the
debtor to use the cash collateral over the creditor's objection. If the bankruptcy
judge is convinced that the debtor can "adequately protect ' 88 the creditor's
interest in the collateral, the judge may allow the debtor to use the collateral.
Here we see a case where the Code can in fact force existing creditors to "loan"
cash collateral to the debtor. This provision of the Code is troubling.
Logically, it does not sit well with other provisions: although a debtor cannot
force creditors to honor pre-existing agreements to loan cash in their
possession, the debtor can force the same creditors to "loan" cash in the
debtor's possession. Equally troubling is the well-known danger that judges
will force loans on terms 89
that are less favorable than comparable loans
negotiated in the marketplace.
We might make some sense of the Code's treatment of cash collateral by
looking more closely at the extent to which it is a firm-specific asset. Cash is
indeed the benchmark fungible asset, but it may not be easy to replace. As

Fire Sales Exist? An Empirical Investigation of Commercial Aircraft Transactions, 53 J. FIN. 939
(1998).
87
See § 741.
88
Just as a bank typically will not extend credit without assurance of repayment, a court will
not permit access to cash collateral unless the debtor can assure the creditor that it will be no worse
off as a result. This assurance, or "adequate protection," may come in the form of a lien on newlyacquired assets or a promise to make periodic cash payments in the future (if a debtor owns an
apartment complex, for example, it might assign future rents to the creditor).
89
See, e.g., George G. Triantis, Financial Slack Policy and the Laws of Secured
Transactions, 29 J. LEGAL STUD.35, 67-68 (2000).
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economists have shown empirically, 90 lending relationships are valuable. A
bank generally gathers extensive information about its borrowers, and the closer
the relationship between a bank and borrower, the greater the availability of
financing. Because of this phenomenon, a troubled firm has strong incentives to
continue dealing with existing creditors and could face a hold-up problem if the
Bankruptcy Code gave creditors free reign to seize cash collateral. The Code
helps protect a firm's investment in pre-existing lending relationships and
reduces hold-up problems by prohibiting creditors from seizing cash collateral.
At the same time, the Code recognizes that cash is not a firm-specific asset and
prohibits the firm from using it unless the secured creditor consents or the court
gives permission. The Code therefore abandons the usual rebuttable
presumption that assets are firm-specific. Instead, with respect to cash, it creates
a rebuttable presumption that the assets are not firm-specific. A debtor firm can
overcome this presumption either by convincing the secured creditor to permit
access to the cash collateral or by convincing the court that it should permit
access over the creditor's objection.
This argument is not wholly satisfactory. Although lending relationships
are important firm-specific assets, would these relationships be destroyed if
lenders were free to seize cash collateral? Lending relationships are the product
of bilateral investments by lender and borrower; a bank generally has as much
interest in continuing a relationship as does the borrower. If lenders were free to
seize cash collateral, debtor firms would be forced to apply for new loans and
might be vulnerable to hold-up problems. But this phenomenon is largely a
distributional concern. The bargaining power of the pre-existing lender may
enable it to extend credit on terms that are less favorable to the debtor, but the
loan will be made in any event. Moreover, if hold-up problems are significant
in bankruptcy, the Code's provisions for cash collateral are patently inadequate.
Most finms enter bankruptcy with little in the way of cash. They may, however,
enter bankruptcy with lines of credit or other commitments from lenders to
extend cash. Yet the Code does nothing to protect these commitments. The
debtor is forced to bargain anew with pre-existing creditors.
It is possible, then, that the terms of the automatic stay are overbroad and
provide too much protection for cash collateral. This observation may help
explain the popularity of asset securitization, a practice in which debtors obtain
financing by selling assets (typically receivables and other assets that generate
cash collateral) to a separate legal entity, which then issues debt claims to
creditors. 9 ' Because the assets are owned by a separate legal entity, they are
beyond the reach of the automatic stay when the debtor files a bankruptcy
petition. Asset securitization, then, can negate the Code's overbroad rules
governing cash collateral.
See generally Mitchell A. Petersen & Raghuram G. Rajan, The Benefits of Lending
90
Relationships: Evidence from Small Business Data, 49 J. FIN. 3 (1994).
See, e-g, Comm. on Bankr. and Corp. Reorganization of the Ass'n of the Bar of the City
91
of New York, New Developments in Structured Finance, 56 BUs. LAW, 95 (2000).
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Derivatives Contracts and the Automatic Stay

Unlike cash collateral, nothing prevents a counterparty from closing out
existing contracts, netting them, and then seizing collateral, which generally
consists of cash, treasury bills, and other financial instruments.
These
provisions governing derivatives contracts make sense under the simple theory
of the automatic stay outlined in the previous section. Derivatives contracts are
fungible, replaceable assets much like cash; indeed, the Code's definition of
"cash collateral" lumps cash and financial securities together. Just as a firm's
going-concern surplus will rarely depend on its cash holdings, its surplus will
rarely depend on
93 its derivatives contracts or the collateral posted to support
those contracts. If one contract is canceled, it can typically be replaced with an
identical contract. If a counterparty seizes government securities posted as
collateral, these securities are easily replaced. For this reason, meaningful
externalities will rarely (if ever) arise when a counterparty cancels a derivatives
contract with an insolvent debtor and seizes collateral.
This theory of derivatives contracts and the automatic stay is fairly
straightforward in cases involving financial enterprises, such as hedge funds,
that become insolvent. The assets of these firms consist almost entirely of
financial contracts. Although much talent and energy may have been spent to
assemble and manage its contracts, there is little or no going-concern surplus in
an insolvent hedge find If a fund is insolvent, it is because the value of its
portfolio has diminished, at least in the short term. The portfolio may increase
in value in the long-term, but this is not a reason to attempt to reorganize the
firm. The firm's assets are fungible and its long-nm potential is not destroyed
when these assets are seized by creditors. Provided the managers can prove that
this long-run potential exists (something the managers would have to do even
if the firm were reorganized under Chapter 11), outside investors would be
willing to pay the firm to reassemble the portfolio. To be sure, transaction
costs will be incurred when the firm reassembles its portfolio, but the small
costs of trading in financial markets seem trivial compared to the costs that
would be borne by counterparties fored to participate in the bankruptcy
process94 and continue dealing with a firm that may be unable to demonstrate
its long-run potential.
Our claim-that the automatic stay should permit derivatives
counterparties to cancel contracts and seize collateral-is more complicated
92
U.S. dollars and government securities account for about 75% of collateral posted by
derivatives counterparties; foreign currency, major index equities, AAA-rated bonds, and other
securities make up the balance. INT'L SWAPS AND DERIVATIVES ASS'N, INC., ISDA COLLATERAL
SURVEY 29 (2000).

93
This assumes, of course, that the collateral underlying the derivatives contracts consists of
non-fin specific assets. This is the case in practice. Id
94
Professional fee and expense awards (which make up only a fraction of total expenses
incurred by the debtor and its creditors) consume about 2% of firm value. Lynn M. LoPucki & Joseph
W. Doherty, The Determinants of Professional Fees in Large Bankruptcy Reorganization Cases, I J.
EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 111 (2004).
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when we consider non-financial firms, such as manufacturing, energy supply,
and telecommunications concerns, that enter insolvency. When a counterparty
cancels a derivatives contract and seizes collateral, it may expose the distressed
firm to increased risk that reduces the value of its non-financial assets. The firm
may have entered the derivatives contract in the first place to hedge particular
risks, such as interest rate and exchange rate fluctuations. This hedge disappears
when a counterparty cancels a derivatives contract. The increased exposure to,
say, exchange-rate risk can harm the firm's operations and its other creditors.
Again, however, the harm to the debtor firm is generally equal to the
counterparty's gain: upon cancellation of the contract, the firm loses a hedge
against, say, interest-rate fluctuations and the counterparty ceases providing this
hedge. The firm can regain the benefits of hedging simply by entering a new
derivatives contract. Indeed, the more specialized the derivative, the more likely
a counterparty may be to reenter a contract with the debtor firm. If the debtor is
party to a highly specialized contract, for example, neither debtor nor its
counterparty may be able to replace it and both will have strong incentives to
renegotiate. To be sure, a firm in bankruptcy generally will be unable to replace
a derivatives contract on precisely the same terms. New counterparties will
charge a premium to deal with a distressed firm. The premium may be so high
that the firm can no longer hedge certain risks; as a result, firm value may fall,
to the detriment of all creditors.
Put this way, it may seem that a derivatives counterparty imposes an
externality on other creditors when it unilaterally cancels a contract. But this is
what economists call a "pecuniary externality" and is present in any
competitive market (indeed, pecuniary externalities are the mechanism
9
guaranteeing Pareto optimal outcomes in competitive markets). Whereas a
secured creditor's decision to seize a debtor firm's core specialized assets will
directly reduce the value of the firm as a going concern, 96 a derivatives
counterparty's decision to cancel a contract affects firm value only by affecting
the price the firm must pay to hedge risk in the future. 97 This indirect effect on
firm value is no different from the effect of an economy-wide increase in demand
for a critical input (say, oil). Assuming a stable supply, the increase in demand
will raise the price of fuel, thereby increasing debtor's costs, reducing profits,
and reducing (at least temporarily) firm value. This "pecuniary" externality is
the desirable by-product of a price system: the increase in price reflects the
increased scarcity of the good. The Bankruptcy Code should be as
(un)concemed about an increase in demand as it is about a derivatives
counterparty's decision to cancel a contract. Both decisions merely expose the
debtor firm to the desirable discipline of market-based prices.

See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 7 (5th ed. 1998).
95
96
By "value of the firm as a going concern," we mean the present value of expected
returns from future operations.
97

See ANDREu MAS-COLELL ET AL., MICROECONOMIC THEORY 352 (1995).
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In any event, a firm's going-concern value is unlikely to be affected by
having to replace its derivatives contracts. To illustrate, consider a typical
fixed-income derivative, the interest-rate swap. For both solvent and insolvent
firms, the cost of entering a new derivatives contract is typically the same as
continuing an existing one. A large fraction (perhaps all) of swaps contracts are
collateralized, meaning that the counterparties post liquid assets (typically cash
and U.S. government securities) as collateral to support their obligations under
the contracts. 98 Additionally, most of these contracts are "marked to market" at
least daily,99 meaning that the counterparties effectively settle their existing
contract and reenter an identical contract every day. Thus, for most firms, little
or no cost is incurred when one contract is replaced with another. The same is
true for both solvent and insolvent firms, with one exception-any firm with a
poor financial history, not merely a firm in bankruptcy, might be required to
post margin when the contract is first signed. Swaps, then, provide a nice
illustration of the phenomenon that a firm's going-concern value will rarely, if
ever, depend upon its derivatives contracts.
The foregoing discussion is undoubtedly controversial, but this only
underscores the difficulty in justifying the Code's special treatment of
derivatives contracts. If the Code can do little to reduce systemic risk (which,
we think, is clear) and if our theory of the automatic stay is in error, then there
is no principled reason for treating derivatives differently.
IV.

Ex Ante Effects of Treating Derivatives Differently

Our analysis is incomplete, as it has focused entirely on the ex post costs
and benefits of the Code's treatment of derivatives contracts. From an ex ante
perspective, two effects are notable. First, the Code lowers the cost of hedging
risk generally, by reducing costs to counterparties from entering contracts with
firms that might suffer distress. Second, the Code encourages rent-seeking
behavior'00 by would-be creditors, who have strong incentives to structure loan
agreements as derivatives contracts. Interestingly, both effects have social costs
and may cut against an efficiency-based argument in favor of treating derivatives
differently.
A.

The Code and Liquidity in OTC Markets

The Code undoubtedly reduces the transactions costs of hedging risk. A
counterparty is more willing to enter a derivatives contract with a firm (or will

98
Michael S. Johannes & Suresh Sundaresan, Pricing Collateralized Swaps 8-9 (May 2003)
(working paper, on file with author).
99
Id.
100
By "rent-seeking behavior" we mean costly efforts undertaken by creditors and
counterparties of a debtor to transfer value ("rents") from other creditors and counterparties to
themselves. See generally Thomas H. Jackson & Robert E. Scott, On the Nature of Bankruptcy: An
Essay on Bankruptcy Sharing and the Creditors' Bargain, 75 VA. L. REv. 155, 201-02 (1989).
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enter at a lower price) if it can minimize the costs it may incur if the firm suffers
financial distress. The Code reduces these costs by protecting counterparties
against "cherry-picking" and by increasing the speed with which a counterparty
can seize collateral. A debtor generally is free to choose which contracts to
perform (accept) and which to breach (reject). If the debtor chooses to breach a
contract, the non-breaching counterparty receives a low-priority unsecured claim
that will typically be paid a few cents on the dollar. This rule creates strong
incentives for debtors to engage in "cherry-picking": to reject all losing
contracts (and pay a few cents in damages) and accept all winning contracts (and
enjoy the full benefits).
Suppose, for example, that a firm has entered two supply agreements with
a contractual partner. When the firm files a bankruptcy petition, one contract is
profitable (to the firm) and one is unprofitable, and the cost of the unprofitable
contract exceeds the benefits of the profitable one. The firm, in other words, has
a net obligation owing to the contractual partner. But netting is generally not
allowed under the Bankruptcy Code.'O Instead, the firm is free to treat the
contracts independently and breach the losing contract, pay pennies in damages,
and continue the winning contract. The result is that the debtor enjoys a net
gain, not a net loss, from the two contracts. Every contractual partner of a
distressed firm faces the prospect of cherry-picking--everyone, that is, except
derivatives counterparties. These counterparties, consequently, anticipate lower
costs in the event that the debtor enters bankruptcy.
Counterparties anticipate lower costs for another reason as well: if the
debtor firm enters bankruptcy, counterparties can immediately terminate the
debtor's interest in the cash, securities, and other collateral that were posted.
This is a benefit not enjoyed by any other creditor, which must typically wait
weeks, months, or years before a court grants it permission to seize collateral
(and if the finm reorganizes, the creditor may never obtain the collateral).
Together, these cost-reducing features of the Bankruptcy Code give
derivatives counterparties strong incentives to enter contracts with firms even if
those firms have a high likelihood of insolvency. Indeed, many economists
suggest that the principal benefit of the Code's special treatment of derivatives
is that it contributes significantly to the availability of over-the-counter
derivatives and therefore has lowered the cost of hedging risk. 2 A casual
glance at the data, plotted for interest-rate and currency swaps, suggests this
might be true. The 1990s saw a significant increase in the notional value of
swaps transactions in particular and OTC derivatives contracts generally. In
June 2000 OTC derivatives accounted for more than 90% of the $108 trillion in
derivatives notional principal accounted for by both exchange-traded and OTC

101
Netting is possible in limited cases subject to the judge-made doctrine of "recoupment,"
which permits a creditor to net two contracts if they arise from the same transaction or occurrence.
See generally COLLIER ON BANKRuPTrcy 553.10 (Lawrence P. King ed., 15th ed. 2004).
102
See, e.g., Bergman et al., supra note 12, at 24-25.
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derivatives. Only a decade ago exchange-traded and OTC derivatives markets
were roughly equal in size. In 1998, the average daily turnover in OTC markets
was estimated to be about $2.7 trillion (about $675 trillion on an annualized
basis). By comparison, in 1999, world GDP was about $31 trillion, and global
net capital flows totaled $394 billion.I 3 Increased liquidity in OTC markets
and firms' greater access to derivatives contracts enables firms to better hedge
risk.

Interest-Rate and Currency Swaps: Notional Amount
Outstanding at Year End
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ISource: ISDA Market Survey (2004)

Increased liquidity does not come free, however. The Code reduces the
transaction costs of hedging risk by placing derivatives counterparties ahead of
other creditors in bankruptcy proceedings. Counterparties are flee to cancel
executory contracts and seize collateral while other contractual partners are
vulnerable to cherry-picking and other secured creditors must bear some of the
costs of the bankruptcy proceedings (including delay in accessing collateral).
The Code, then, redistributes wealth from ordinary creditors to derivatives
counterparties. Ordinary creditors can respond by increasing the price of credit,
which may limit the investment opportunities of some firms, or by seeking to
limit (via contract) a borrower's access to OTC markets. But such contracting
generates transaction costs, which are presumably non-trivial (otherwise the
Code's effect on the transaction costs of hedging is implausible).
We therefore question the net social benefit of increasing liquidity in OTC
markets via redistributive provisions in the Bankruptcy Code. Enhanced
liquidity is undoubtedly a social good, especially when it is the product of
technological innovation (such as the growth of organized exchanges). It is less

103
INT'L MONETARY FUND, OCCASIONAL PAPER NO. 203, MODERN BANKING AND OTC
DERIVATIVES MARKETS 9 (2000).
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obviously a social good when it is the product of a government subsidy, paid
for by other creditors.'04
B.

Effects on Rent Seeking
In Part I we presented an argument in favor of exempting derivatives

contracts from the automatic stay, but we assumed that the identities of
creditors and counterparties were fixed. If, instead, a would-be creditor could

switch to being a derivatives counterparty prior to a counterparty's insolvency,
there could be significant distributional effects. For example, an existing
creditor might take steps to convert its debt contract into a derivatives contract,
or a bank might enter a derivatives contract instead of lending directly to a firm.

There are, in fact, many ways to offer financing through a derivatives
contract rather than an ordinary debt contract. One is to use total return swaps.
Debtor, for example, wants to borrow $1 million from Bank in order to
purchase bonds. If Debtor borrows directly from Bank, it will pay interest equal
to LIBOR plus, say, 2.5% per annum. The spread above LIBOR compensates

Bank for the risk of default and the costs of bankruptcy. This type of loan
agreement, however, will subject Bank to the automatic stay if Debtor enters
bankruptcy. To avoid the stay, Bank proposes the following transaction: Bank

will purchase $1 million worth of the bonds and pay the total return (coupons,
appreciation, etc.) on the bonds to Debtor for T periods. In return, Debtor will
pay Bank LIBOR plus 1.5% per annum on a $1 million notional amount. At

104
It may be worth mentioning another potential downside to the Code's cost-reducing
provisions. As derivatives counterparties bear less of the costs of a firm's insolvency, they have fewer
incentives to monitor its financial condition. This effect is important, however, only if the reduction in
monitoring incentives is significant, if monitoring by other creditors and by shareholders is inadequate,
and if derivatives counterparties would continue to deal with the firm even if Congress eliminated the
Bankruptcy Code's special treatment of derivatives. We doubt that these conditions are satisfied in the
vast majority of cases. For example, notwithstanding the Code's special treatment of derivatives
contracts, counterparties still have strong incentives to monitor the firm's financial condition. Most
derivatives contracts are marked-to-market and require the firm to post additional collateral as its
estimated liability under the contract increases. Consider, again, an interest-rate swap. the firm agrees
to pay the counterparty, say, 5% per annum for two years on a notional principal (perhaps $10
million); in return, the counterparty agrees to pay the firm the six-month LIBOR rate on the same
principal. As the LIBOR rate dips below 5%, the firm is a net debtor under the contract. Most interest
rate swaps will require the firm to post collateral to support its net indebtedness, and the farther
LIBOR dips below 5%, the more collateral must be posted. Although the contract is fully collateralized
at any point in time and although the Code permits the counterparty to seize this collateral upon the
firm's insolvency, the counterparty continues to have incentives to monitor the firm's financial
condition. The possibility remains that LIBOR will dip further below 5%, but the firm will be unable to
post the requisite collateral. Neither collateralization nor the Code therefore eliminates monitoring
incentives.
Additionally, and perhaps more importantly, counterparties now deal with the firm precisely
because the Code has lowered the costs of contracting. If these costs are increased, perhaps by
eliminating the Code's special treatment of derivatives, counterparties will be less interested in dealing
with and monitoring firms. Thus, it is difficult to assess whether the Code raises or lowers
counterparty-monitoring. Put differently, we suspect that the Code's effect on creditor monitoring
probably exists but is trivial in magnitude. See Bergman et al., supra note 12, for additional, related
arguments.
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the end of the life of the contract (in period T), the value of the bonds will
either exceed or fall below $1 million. If it exceeds $1 million, Bank pays
Debtor the difference; if it falls below that amount, Debtor pays Bank the
difference. Finally, and most importantly, throughout the life of the contract,
Debtor (the more risky party) must post collateral equal to its expected
obligation at date T. Although functionally equivalent to an ordinary debt
contract, this transaction creates a derivatives contract subject to the Code's
special provisions. If Debtor seeks bankruptcy protection, Bank is flee to
terminate the contract and seize collateral.
More exotic contracts are possible. Again, suppose that Debtor wants to
borrow $1 million from Bank. Suppose also that Debtor's Affiliate is willing
to guarantee the indebtedness. The guarantee, however, is of little use to Bank
if Affiliate and Debtor are likely to enter bankruptcy at the same time. To take
advantage of the Code's special treatment of derivatives contracts, Bank
proposes the following contract: Bank loans $1 million to Debtor in exchange
for an unsecured note. Bank simultaneously enters a credit default option with
Affiliate. This option allows Bank to put the note to Affiliate in the event
Debtor defaults. The option contract requires Affiliate to post margin equal to
its expected obligation (which varies with Debtor's financial condition). Thus,
if Debtor and Affiliate enter bankruptcy, Bank enjoys the Code's special
treatment of derivatives contracts and can seize the margin posted by Affiliate.
These types of contracts, which substitute derivatives contracts for debt
contracts, are relatively costly to write and are vulnerable to the risk that a court
will look beyond their formal trappings and recharacterize them as ordinary debt
contracts. On the other hand, the gain from writing these contracts increases as
a potential borrower's financial condition worsens. Thus, if the Bankruptcy
Code creates significant incentives for lenders to structure debt contracts as
derivatives contracts, these incentives should be strongest when the borrower is
financially distressed. Empirically, this suggests that we should see a firm's
involvement in derivatives contracts (as measured by the notional value of such
contracts) increase in the months or years before it enters bankruptcy.
In the absence of comprehensive data on this issue, we can point to
anecdotal evidence that the Bankruptcy Code does encourage creditors to
exploit the special provisions for derivatives contracts, at least in extreme cases.
The case of Enron is again instructive. During the months before filing its
Chapter 11 petition, the firm entered a wide range of derivatives contracts that
appear to have disguised some loans as derivatives contracts,10 5 structured other

105
Enron has attempted to recharacterize these contracts as loans and thereby prevent
counterparties from benefiting from the Code's special treatment of derivatives. See Enron Corp. v.
Citigroup Inc., No. 03-09266 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Sept. 24, 2003). Also see defendant Deutsche Bank's
partial motion to dismiss, asserting its right to take advantage of exceptions to the automatic stay for
derivatives contracts, in Memorandum of Law in Support of Defendants the Deutsche Bank Entities'
Partial Motion to Dismiss, Enron Corp. v. Citigroup, Inc., No. 03-09266 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Feb. 17,

2003).
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loans as sales combined with derivatives contracts, 0 6 and gambled on the
firm's stock price. 0 7 Most of these contracts have been the subject of litigation,
with Enron attempting to recover collateral seized by the counterparties to these
contracts.
We are not the first to notice that the Code encourages creditors to use
derivatives contracts to reduce the costs of bankruptcy. Indeed, a recent
textbook'08 encourages creditors to enter debt contracts and interest rate swaps
simultaneously in order to circumvent some of the Code's restrictions on debt
contracts. 1° We are, however, among the first to show the strength of the
Code's incentives to engage in such rent-seeking behavior. The Code does not
merely encourage creditors to enter debt and derivatives contracts
simultaneously; it encourages creditors to avoid debt contracts entirely.
This type of rent-seeking behavior shifts wealth from general creditors to
derivatives counterparties ex post. If Affiliate and Debtor file bankruptcy
petitions, Bank is better off than if it entered an ordinary loan agreement with
Debtor. Other creditors are worse off. Some creditors may be able to protect
themselves ex ante, by charging higher interest rates as compensation for the
losses resulting from rent-seeking. Other creditors may be unable to protect
themselves, including accident victims (non-consensual creditors). In addition,
the Code may unintentionally alter the debt structure of firms towards a greater
reliance on derivatives by favoring derivatives counterparties over other
creditors. The implications of such a shift for firms and debt markets are
unclear.
V.

Conclusion

Our analysis suggests that the Code's special treatment of derivatives
contracts cannot be justified by a fear of systemic risk in derivatives markets.
Indeed, exempting derivatives counterparties from the automatic stay may make
matters worse by increasing systemic risk. But this conclusion does not
necessarily imply that it is a mistake to afford derivatives special treatment
under the Code. We propose an efficiency-based rationale for treating them
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differently that has nothing to do with fear of systemic risk: derivatives
contracts merit special treatment because they, like cash, are not firm-specific
assets. A firm's going concern value does not depend on retention of prepetition contracts or cash. To be sure, a firm cannot survive without cash and
may be less likely to survive without derivatives contracts. But a firm can
replace pre-petition cash with post-petition loans and can replace pre-petition
derivatives contracts with post-petition derivatives contracts. Although it may
be costly to replace a customized machine, little cost is incurred in replacing
cash and derivatives contracts. Thus, there is no efficiency-based reason for the
Bankruptcy Code to interfere with the non-bankruptcy-law entitlements of
derivatives counterparties and creditors with security interests in cash collateral.
They should be free to seize their collateral.
But the case for reordering priorities in bankruptcy to favor derivatives
counterparties on grounds of economic efficiency is an uneasy one for two
reasons. First, it undermines the current treatment of cash collateral under the
Code (which is subject to the automatic stay). Second, it does not take account
of possible ex ante effects of giving special treatment to derivatives contracts. In
particular, there will be redistribution costs because ordinary creditors will take
steps to avoid (or at least receive compensation for) the costs they bear when
lenders attempt to disguise loans as derivatives contracts. These costs must be
weighed against the potential benefits of giving special treatment to derivatives
contracts.
Our analysis, however, should worry members of Congress and legislators
in other countries. They have been lobbied heavily by special interest groups
(such as ISDA) to expand the special treatment of derivatives on grounds that
such legislation is necessary to prevent a systemic meltdown in OTC
derivatives markets should a derivatives counterparty suffer financial distress.
Our analysis casts serious doubt on this proposition. Systemic risk may be a
real threat, but bankruptcy law has no role to play in minimizing it.
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